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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(a) as an appeal 
from the final order or decree resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of the 
Department of Workforce Services, a state agency of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. FIRST ISSUE: AN INDIVIDUAL CAN ENGAGE IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
ACTIVITIES AND STILL RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. 
Whether in the adjudicative proceedings, the Department of Workforce Services erred in 
its determination that Petitioner Rindlisbacher was not unemployed as a matter of 
law(and therefore unentitled to benefits) due to Rindlisbacher's self employment 
activities which generated no income. 
1. This is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2D 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. The issue was contained within the principal issue before the Workforce 
Appeals Board, Record 69, and was also the basis for Rindlisbacher's 
Motion for Summary Disposition. 
A. SECOND ISSUE: THE CLAIM OF FRAUD IS INAPPROPRIATELY 
IMPOSED ESPECIALLY WHEN THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE FOR 
INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS OBTAINED AFTER THE FACT. 
The Department of Workforce Services erred in presuming a fraud penalty as a matter of 
law against Rindlisbacher for his failure to report self employment activities, when, 
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during such time the publications of the Department of Workforce Services imply that 
such activity need not be reported, especially when Rindlisbacher's knowledge, if any, 
was after the receipt of benefits. 
1. The standard of appellate review with supporting authority. This is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2D 
932, 939 (Utah 1994). Fraud may not be presumed whenever false 
information has been provided or material information omitted and 
benefits overpaid. The Department has the burden of proof, which is the 
responsibility to establish all the elements of fraud by a preponderance of 
evidence. R994-405-503, Unemployment Insurance Rules. 
2. The issue was contained within the secondary issue before the Workforce 
Appeals Board, Record 69. 
A. THIRD ISSUE: FRAILTIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS. 
Were Claimants constitutional rights, especially the right to call witnesses, impeded by 
the administrative process, especially where claimants under such procedures are 
generally indigent and risk the loss of property. After issuing its Denial of 
Reconsideration, did the Department of Workforce Services waive its claim for a 
penalty? Costs of appeal should be awarded Rindlisbacher. 
1. The standard of appellate review with supporting authority. This is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2D 
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932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. Claimant Rindlisbacher appeared pro-se throughout the proceedings. Such 
issue, attacking the process and the fmder-of-fact was chilled during the 
proceedings . 
CENTRALLY IMPORTANT OR DETERMINATIVE 
AUTHORITY OTHER THAN PRECEDENT 
Department of Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide, page 10 
WORK/EARNINGS REPORTING 
All work and earnings while claiming benefits must be reported for the 
week in which you work. This may or may not be the same week you are 
paid. This includes full or part-time work for any employer, military 
reserve or national guard unit, individual, charitable organization, or 
church. Earnings received from farming must also be included. You must 
also report earnings from self employment, commission sales and holiday, 
severance, or vacation pay; also, tips and the cash value of work performed 
in exchange for anything of value. 
Utah Code Annotated 35A-4-204(l) 
Definition of employment. Subject to the other provisions of this section, 
"employment" means any service performed for wages or under any 
contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or implied, including 
service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation. 
Utah Code Annotated 35A-4-207(l)(a) 
Unemployment. An individual is "unemployed" in any week during which 
he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to 
him, or in any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to him 
with respect to the week are less than his weekly benefit amount. 
Department of Workforce Services Rule 994-405-503(2) 
Fraud may not be presumed whenever false information has been provided or material 
information omitted and benefits overpaid. The Department has the burden of proof, 
which is the responsibility to establish all the elements of fraud. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE This appeal is from a final decision of the 
Workforce Appeals Board of the Utah Department of Workforce Services. 
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS The formal adjudicative proceedings of the 
Department of Workforce Services commenced on August 25, 2003 from the 
issuance of a Decision of Eligibility and Notice of Overpayment along with a 
Form 615-J Decision from the Department, 
1. the appeal of which was determined by the Decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge on October 2, 2003, 
2. the appeal of which was determined by the Decision of the Workforce 
Appeals Board on December 11, 2003, 
3. the request for rehearing of which was denied on January 14, 2004. 
4. The Petition for Review (appeal) was filed February 12, 2004. 
5. Inasmuch as this involves a Petition for Review from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of a state agency, no motions were filed under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Rule 24„ or Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6, although 
Rindlisbacher filed its Motion for Summary Disposition. 
6. Rindlisbacher's Motion for Summary Disposition was denied May 14, 
2004, with a ruling on the issues deferred pending plenary presentation by 
Rindlisbacher's Appeal Brief Page 4 
the parties. 
DISPOSITION BELOW On August 25, 2003, The Utah Department of 
Workforce Services decided, "You are establishing or operating your own 
business. You are not unemployed within the meaning of the Act although you 
may be earning less than your weekly benefit amount. R21 On appeal, such has 
been confirmed and a fraud penalty imposed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, the claimant worked 
as a recruiter for Thera Peak Incorporated through April 7, 2003. R56 
2. He was determined eligible and was paid unemployment insurance benefits for 
each of the weeks ended April 26, 2003 through August 9, 2003. R56-57. 
3. The Claimant was unsuccessful in finding new work. R57. 
4. He obtained a license (an assumed name certificate for self-employment) as 
Bacher & Company from the Department of Commerce on April 11, 2003. R 3, 
57 
5. He has generated no income from his business pursuits and spent less than full-
time R57 
6. The claimant received a copy of the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide at 
the time he filed his initial claim for unemployment insurance benefits which he 
was instructed to read. R57. 
7. Regarding self-employment, it states, "All work and earnings while claiming 
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benefits must be reported . . . You must also report earnings from self-
employment . . ." R57 
8. The claimant filed telephonic claims (answering questions) for unemployment 
insurance benefits for the weeks ended April 12, 2003, through August 9, 2003. 
R57 
9. He answered "no" to the question, "During the week, did you work?" R57-58 
10. He did not consider his activities with Bacher and Company as employment and 
had no earnings from the company. R58 
11. On August 20, 2003, the claimant completed a Benefit Payment Control 
Claimant Questionnaire form, which included questions regarding his self-
employment activities. R58. 
12. Such Questionnaire contained the first indication in the record that implied that 
one could not receive unemployment benefits if he was self-employed. Rl 1 
13. Rindlisbacher thereafter ceased to collect unemployment benefits. R56 
14. On August 21, 2003, The Department sent Rindlisbacher a Notice of Issue, 
following on August 25, 2003 with a Decision of Eligibility which stated, "You 
are establishing or operating your own business. You are not unemployed within 
the meaning of the Act although you may be earning less than your weekly 
benefit amount." R20, 21 
15. The Department denied benefits retroactive to April 13, 2003 and 
continuing through August 7, 2004. Rindlisbacher had been receiving 
$373.00 as his weekly benefit amount (totaling $5,968.00), which 
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Rindlisbacher was asked to repay to the Department along with a penalty 
of $5,968.00 (totaling $11,936.00) plus a forfeiture of future benefits (52 
weeks @$373.00 equals $19,396). R20, 21 
From the document provided by the Department, it appeared that the only 
remedy available to Rindlisbacher was the administrative appeals process, 
without benefit of counsel, without benefit of a trial by jury, with the risk of a 
taking of his property, all arising from a telephonic hearing in which, if he fails to 
participate, will result in a default. R20, 21 (Throughout the process and the 
administrative appeals, Rindlisbacher dutifully following the instructions as to 
further appeal in each instance). Throughout, the Department's asserted position 
was that one could not receive unemployment benefits if he was self-employed, 
even if it was inaccurate and false.) 
17. The Department effectively denied Rindlisbacher's right to have 
witnesses appear on his behalf. R 53-55 
After Rindlisbacher's request for a rehearing was denied, Rindlisbacher received 
a Notice from the Department of Workforce Services that no longer included the 
penalty. Rindlisbacher's counsel contacted the Department by telephone to 
confirm that only the claimed overpayment, and not the penalty was being 
imposed. After reminding the Department that an appeal process had just been 
completed, and waiting on hold for a period of time, such confirmation was 
given and payment arrangements made. A confirming letter was sent to the 
Department. The Department issued its confirmation of the payment 
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arrangement. Thereafter, the Department reneged, stating that it had no statutory 
authority to compromise the claim and that Rindlisbacher's only recourse was by 
the Court of Appeals. R84-87 
18. From the filing of the Petition to Review with the Court of Appeals, 
Rinclisbacher's attorney has spent 72.4 hours and incurred $73.00 in costs up to 
the time of submission of this brief. The normal billing rate of such attorney is 
$175.00 per hour. (Such attorney verifies the same by his signature hereon). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Department's Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide correctly indicates 
that one may be self-employed and still receive unemployment benefits so long as such 
self-employment activities do not generate income in excess of the weekly benefit 
amount. Such position contained in the Department Guide is supported by applicable 
statute, department rules, legal precedent, and policy. The Guide is given to a claimant 
(and was given to Rindlisbacher) as a reliable reference for appropriate conduct. 
However, the Department claimed a contrary position with respect to self-
employment. Their contrary position is that if a claimant is self-employed, he is 
ineligible for benefits. With Rindlisbacher, that contrary position was not revealed until 
he received an audit questionnaire, too late and after the receipt of his benefits. 
The administrative law judge erred in ruling that although it generated no income, 
Rindlisbacher's self employment activity equates to a denial of benefits. 
Even if such self employment activity resulted in a denial of benefits, the 
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administrative law judge further erred in finding an intention to defraud. The requisite 
intent was found on a failure to comply with an alleged reporting requirement. The 
"reporting requirement" proves to have been non-existent. Furthermore, even if true, 
Rindlisbacher's knowledge of such "reporting requirement" was after the fact and too 
late. By Department rule, fraud may not be presumed. The judge apparently was 
misled by the faulty sequence of exhibits or other lack of identification to presume 
fraudulent intent. With proper sequence, the reasoning should have been: "Claimant's 
self-employment activities were not reported in his weekly telephonic claims (nor were 
they asked to be reported), yet, upon later audit, Claimant responded that he had engaged 
in self-employment activities generating no income." Presuming Fraud on such basis was 
incorrect. 
Both issues might have been avoided by the addition or observance of basic due 
process, especially considering the nature of the proceedings. Administrative hearings 
on unemployment claims invariably pit an already distressed individual in jeopardy of 
losing what precious little assets remain against a governmental leviathan forced to make 
judgments against itself in order to provide relief. Attempts to invoke constitutional 
protections, such as the right to call witnesses, were thwarted, or at least impeded, by 
such process. Certainly, such was not envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, 
guaranteeing due process under the law. 
ARGUMENT 
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FIRST ISSUE: AN INDIVIDUAL CAN ENGAGE IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
ACTIVITIES AND STILL RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. 
Contrary to its own published standard, state statute, regulation, precedent and 
policy (each discussed below), the Department of Workforce Services erred in its 
determination that due to Petitioner Rindlisbacher being self-employed, though 
generating no income, he was therefore unentitled to benefits. 
A. THE DEPARTMENT'S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANT 
GUIDE DOES NOT PROHIBIT, BUT RATHER MAY ENCOURAGE SELF-
EMPLOYMENT 
As more fully set forth herein, and in adherence to relevant statute, regulations, 
and precedent, the Department's Unemployment Insurance Claimant's Guide 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "GUIDE") correctly indicates that one may be self-
employed and still receive unemployment benefits so long as such self-employment 
activities do not generate income in excess of the weekly benefit amount. The Guide is 
given to a claimant (and was given to Rindlisbacher) as a reliable reference for 
appropriate conduct. The GUIDE conspicuously states on its front cover, 
-IMPORTANT-
To ensure your ongoing eligiblity, use this guide 
as needed. You will be held accountable for the 
information contained within. 
The Department, by such notice, not only suggests, but directs the use of such guide in 
determining eligibility. 
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If, as the Department contends with Rindlisbacher, self-employment activities are 
prohibited in obtaining unemployment benefits, certainly the GUIDE would state as 
such. However, the only mention of self employment in such guide is, surprisingly, not 
contained in the section entitled DENIAL OF BENEFITS, pages 14 through 15, where 
six different reasons for denial of benefits is listed and where, if impermissible its 
mention would most likely be found. Its absence, in such section alone should be 
sufficient to overcome the Department's contention of self-employment prohibition. 
Furthermore, its absence in such section, supports Rindlisbacher's contention that self-
employment is permitted. 
Such is not the only suggestion that self employment is permissible. The section 
entitled, WORK/EARNINGS REPORTING, contains the following: 
All work and earnings while claiming benefits must be reported . . .This 
includes full or part-time work for any employer, military reserve or 
national guard unit, individual, charitable organization, or church. 
Earnings received from farming must also be included. You must also 
report earnings from self employment..." 
Interestingly, the sentence containing self-employment specifies only "earnings" (not 
work) from self-employment to be reported. Therefore, after reading such section of the 
GUIDE, and when asked the question, "During the week, did you work?" a claimant 
engaged in self-employment activities would properly respond, "no." Such was the case 
with Rindlisbacher. The apparent reason earnings must be reported is to ensure that 
income from self-employment activities do not exceed the weekly benefit amount. Since 
Rindlisbacher's Appeal Brief Page 11 
no earnings were generated, whether they exceeded the weekly benefit amount is not at 
issue. 
The Department found that Rindlisbacher spent less than full time1 in his self-
employment activities, and that from such activities, Rindlisbacher generated no income. 
Based on the findings, according to the Guide, no reporting was required. 
If, however, income was generated, such should have been reported. But, by 
requiring such reporting, the Guide clearly indicates that self-employment activities are 
indeed permitted, so long as earnings for that particular week do not equal or exceed the 
weekly benefit amount, Guide, page 11 (Earnings Allowance), which again is not at 
issue here.. 
Self Employment is nowhere prohibited in the Guide, rather, its inclusion in 
reporting requirements suggests it is permitted or encouraged. Such, alone, should be 
sufficient for the appeals court to reverse in favor of Rindlisbacher. 
B. APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT PROHIBIT, BUT RATHER 
MAY ENCOURAGE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Section 35A-4-204 and Section 35A-4-207, Utah Code Annotated, contain 
specific definitions of "employment" and "unemployment" as follows: 
35A-4-204(l) Definition of employment. Subject to the other provisions 
of this section, "employment" means any service performed for wages or 
under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or implied, 
'Rule 994-207-102(l)(a) of The Unemployment Insurance Rules provides:"Full-time work will generally be 
considered to be 40 hours a week. The Administrative law judge found that Rindlisbacher devoted less than 40 
hours per week to his self-employment activities. 
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including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a 
corporation. 
35A-4-207(l)(a) Unemployment. An individual is "unemployed" in any 
week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no 
wages are payable to him, or in any week of less than full-time work if the 
wages payable to him with respect to the week are less than his weekly 
benefit amount. 
Even under such broad definitions, no prohibition of self-employment activities 
exists. There is no evidence, nor is there claimed to be evidence, that Rindlisbacher's 
self-employment activities were as a corporation (no service as an officer of a 
corporation was given), nor were services performed under contract, nor for wages. 
The absence of such prohibition implies its permission under the statute. Even if 
Rindlisbacher failed to rely on the Guide and had sought to review these statutes, he 
would not be alerted to the Department's erroneous position that the self-employment 
activities are prohibited. Under either definition, the Department erred in ruling 
Rindlisbacher was "not unemployed" by virtue of his being "self employed." No such 
prohibition exists. No statutory prohibition of self-employment exists in the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
C. DEPARTMENT RULES DO NOT PROHIBIT, BUT RATHER MAY 
ENCOURAGE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
The Department, under Utah Code Annotated, 35A-4-207(l)(b) is authorized to 
prescribe certain rules. The scope of its prescription does not include redefining 
unemployment to exclude the self-employed. 
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Despite the limited scope of such prescription, the Department has promulgated 
rules whereby the self-employed may be excluded from unemployment benefits. 
Department Rule R994-207-104(l)(b)(i) Unemployment Insurance Rules states: 
A claimant may earn up to 30% of his weekly benefit amount in total self-
employment plus work for wages before a reduction is made in the 
unemployment insurance payment for that week. When the estimated 
income amount equals or exceeds the weekly benefit amount, the claimant 
is "not unemployed" and benefits will not be allowed. 
However, there was no finding that the estimated income amount equaled or exceeded 
the weekly benefit amount. Rather, the finding was that Rindlisbacher generated no 
income from his self-employment. Application of the Department's rule not only 
supports Rindlisbacher5s claim of continued eligibility, but clearly mandates not even a 
reduction in benefits. It further clearly sets forth the point in time when self employment 
would rise to the level of being "not unemployed." That point of time, when the income 
amount equals or exceeds the benefit amount was never reached. No income was 
earned. 
Application of the Department's rule supports Rindlisbacher's claim of continued 
eligibility. The position of the Department that self-employment activities are prohibited 
is totally inconsistent with their own rules. 
D. RELEVANT PRECEDENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT, BUT RATHER MAY 
ENCOURAGE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Despite a vigorous dissent (citing conflicting Idaho and Pennsylvania precedents 
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which held that one who is self-employed is not "unemployed"), the majority opinion of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Johnson v. Board of Review, 7 Utah 2d 113, 
320 P.2d 315 (Utah 1958) held (page 317) that: 
one receiving less than his "weekly benefit amount" should be considered 
eligible, whether employed by another or self-employed. 
While Johnson is an older case (and also involved issues, not involved here, of 
calculating the weekly amount received from self-employment), it remains the 
controlling, applicable precedent in the State of Utah. Unlike the present case, where the 
Department found that Rindlisbacher received no income from his self-employment 
activities, the progeny of Johnson all had different distinguishing factual circumstances 
or issues2, yet each upheld and supported the ruling in Johnson. A fortiori, the principal 
should apply today to the instant case and the Petition granted. 
E. POLICY 
Extant among the GUIDE, statutes, regulations, and precedent, is a policy to 
encourage, rather than discourage, productive activities that limit or eliminate a 
claimant's reliance on Worker's Compensation. As with other activities, protections 
against abuse exist regarding self-employment activities by limiting and offsetting 
2In Child v. Board of Review, 8 Utah 2d 239, 332 P2d 930, the court would not permit an individual to "lay 
himself off and receive benefits." Cruz v. Department of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 393,453 P2d 894 
involved unemployment of a striking employee. In Kearl v. Department of Employment Security, 676 P2d 385 (Utah 
1983) compensation was received and the self-employment was a going business...However, all of these cases, and 
others, cite Johnson with authority, which remains despite subsequent amendments and changes (not applicable here) 
to the applicable statutory code provisions. 
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income to the weekly benefit amount. To prohibit self-employment activities as a 
possible means would be contrary to such policy. 
SECOND ISSUE: THE CLAIM OF FRAUD IS INAPPROPRIATELY IMPOSED, 
ESPECIALLY WHEN THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE FOR INTENT TO 
DEFRAUD IS OBTAINED AFTER THE FACT. 
The Department of Workforce Services erred in imposing a fraud penalty as a matter of 
law against Rindlisbacher for failure to report his self-employment activities while 
receiving benefits, when, during such time the publications and questionnaires of the 
Department of Workforce Services do not indicate that such activity need be reported. 
The questionnaire that first alerted him that such activity may have been prohibited and 
to which he appropriately responded was August 20, 2003-too late and after the receipt 
of benefits. 
A. THE GUIDE RELIABLY INDICATES SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
ACTIVITIES WERE NOT REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED, ELIMINATING THE 
BASIS FOR FRAUD. 
Even if such self employment activity resulted in a denial of benefits, the 
administrative law judge further erred in finding an intention to defraud. The requisite 
intent was founded on a failure to comply with an alleged reporting requirement. The 
"reporting requirement" proves to have been non-existent in this case. 
Discussion on the first issue established the importance and applicability of the 
GUIDE. The Fraud penally was imposed due to the failure of Rindlisbacher to report his 
self-employment activities. Another look at the GUIDE in conjunction with the 
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FINDINGS clearly indicate the reporting requirements were either non-existent or 
fulfilled. This reporting requirement is argued under Issue 1 A, but again is briefl set 
forth herein. 
The section of the GUIDE entitled, WORK/EARNINGS REPORTING, contains 
the following: 
All work and earnings while claiming benefits must be reported . . .This 
includes full or part-time work for any employer, military reserve or 
national guard unit, individual, charitable organization, or church. 
Earnings received from farming must also be included. You must also 
report earnings from self employment.. ." 
Note that the sentence containing self-employment specifies only "earnings" (not 
work) from self-employment to be reported. The Department found that Rindlisbacher5s 
self employment activities generated no income. Based on the findings, according to the 
Guide, no reporting was therefore required. Given the esteem of the GUIDE, and the 
instructions to claimant to rely thereon, no fraud penalty should be imposed absent its 
intentional violation. 
B. THE PRESUMED FRAUD BASED ON THE FILING OF CLAIMS IS 
FAULTY. 
Even if the self-employment activities were required to be reported, the Findings 
of Fact indicate that Rindlisbacher did not know of such requirement until faced with the 
completion of an audit questionnaire. By Department Rule, Fraud may not be presumed. 
The administrative law judge erred in finding an implied intention to defraud during the 
period Rindlisbacher filed for claims. 
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Fraud may not be presumed whenever false information has been provided 
or material information omitted and benefits overpaid. The Department has the 
burden of proof, which is the responsibility to establish all the elements of fraud 
by a preponderance of evidence. R994-405-503, Unemployment Insurance Rules. 
The judge presumed fraud. Perhaps due to the faulty order of exhibits, the judge 
relied on a faulty sequence between the audit questionnaire and the filing for claims. 
The court reasoned that Claimant completed the (audit) questionnaire regarding self-
employment 
"yet failed to report that same status when he filed his telephonic claims 
each week." 
The faulty reasoning implies that the completion of the audit questionnaire was 
evidence of Rindlisbacher's knowledge of the filing requirement, yet, with that 
knowledge, he then proceeded to exclude self-employment activities from his reporting. 
In order to make the implication, the reasoning only makes sense if, as indicated in the 
courts statement, one followed the other, i.e.; if the audit questionnaire was completed 
before the filing of claims-which is not the case. 
The audit questionnaire was prepared after all claims had been made. The judge 
apparently was misled by the faulty sequence of exhibits or other lack of identification of 
the audit questionnaire. 
With the documents proper sequence, the resultant reasoning should have been: 
"Claimant's self-employment activities were not reported in his weekly 
telephonic claims (nor were they asked to be reported), yet, upon later 
audit, Claimant responded that he had engaged in self-employment 
activities generating no income." 
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Since Fraud may not be presumed from a failure to report, the Judge's 
presumption of fraud fails. With such reasoning, certainly there is little, if any, basis to 
impose the fraud penalty. 
THIRD ISSUE: A CORRECT OUTCOME MAY HAVE RESULTED BY 
OBSERVANCE OF BASIC DUE PROCESS 
From the document provided by The Department, it appeared that the only remedy 
available to Rindlisbacher was the administrative appeals process, without benefit of counsel, 
without benefit of a trial by jury, with the risk of a taking of his property, all arising from a 
telephonic hearing in which, if he fails to participate, will result in a default. 
A. DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, OBSERVATION OF 
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THE CALLING OF 
WITNESSES, WERE IMPEDED OR VIOLATED. 
Especially in dealing with unemployed individuals lacking funds, though 
characterized as an administrative or civil proceeding, with the State as a prosecutor, the 
hearing has the same elements as a criminal proceeding, but without the trappings 
protecting individual rights. The administrative law judge would have been in a better 
position to make a fair determination by observance of basic due process, especially due 
to the nature of the proceedings. Administrative hearings on unemployment claims 
invariably pit an already distressed individual in jeopardy of losing what precious little 
assets remain against a governmental leviathan which makes its own rules, attempting to 
persuade it to make judgments against itself in order to provide relief. 
Issues may have been avoided if claimant had had the assistance of counsel in the 
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administrative hearings and was afforded certain basic due process protections, but the 
cost (time and expense already expended exceed the Department's claim) he was unable 
to do so. Besides the failure to properly resolve the two main issues already discussed, 
certainly a difference in a presentation and understanding of the facts could have been 
made. For example, in this case, additional information that may have made a difference 
might have been obtained, perhaps the calling of an additional witness, which right was 
effectively denied, as follows (R53-55): 
After responding to all of the questions of the Judge and the Attorney for 
the Department, and thinking that the proceeding was winding up, Rindlisbacher 
asked, "And what about any of the witnesses that I had?" 
The judge then entered into a lengthy exchange, chilling Rindlisbacher5 s 
request. Far into the exchange, the Judge stated, "I don't have a lot of time today, 
but I don't want to deny you the right to have a witness. Now if she has 
something to say, I'm happy to call her." 
"Please call her,"Rindlisbacher repeated his desire, previously expressed 
several times. 
The judge responded by a fearful, imposing, pronouncement, "I'm going 
to ask you to ask questions of her that would be relevant to the issues before me." 
Appearing pro se, his future in the hands of the judge, with no legal 
background except watching a few Perry Mason programs or the like, where cries 
of "irrelevance" resound, Rindlisbacher's reaction was predictable, in acceding to 
the judge's obvious preference. 
Even if a witness has no additional knowledge, the additional testimony could 
have been used to substantiate the facts, express the facts in a different manner so as to 
give them a more complete meaning, or, especially in a matter where fraud or intent is an 
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issue, act as a character witness. Rindlisbacher's right was clearly chilled by the 
exchange with the Judge. 
The interchange covered three (R53-55) of the total 23 pages, fully 1/8 of the 
proceedings. Clearly, Rindlisbacher wanted to have his wife called as a witness, but was 
effectively denied such right. 
Such an individual, as in this case, would have no choice but to trust the system 
without question and with little understanding of its impact. Such system, by its use of 
telephonic hearings and faceless claimants, fails to afford the administrative judge an 
opportunity to sympathize with a claimant who is already disadvantaged in the 
presentation of his case, no matter how worthy. Certainly, such was not envisioned by 
the framers of the Constitution, guaranteeing due process under the law. 
B. THE DEPARTMENT WAIVED PORTIONS OF ITS JUDGMENT AFTER THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING. 
Despite request otherwise, the record produced by the Department of Workforce 
Services is deficient with regard to this matter, failing to include the specific items 
requested. Nevertheless, it has included the letter and response that outlines the claim. 
Such only further evidences the limitations of the Department of Workforce Services 
acting as its own adjudicator. After issuing its Denial of Reconsideration, the actions of 
the Department of Workforce Service in issuing a Notice of Fault Overpayment 
excluding the fraud penalty; its designated and authorized employee with knowledge of 
such proceedings confirming that no fraud penalty will be imposed; receipt of a written 
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confirmation of its understanding of the same; and it sending a written confirmation of 
such amount with payment arrangements excluding any fraud penalty; constitutes a 
waiver of such fraud penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department of Workforce Services determined that Rindlisbacher engaged in 
self-employment activities and therefore not entitled to Unemployment Insurance 
Benefits, requiring repayment of all benefits received, denial of future benefits, and 
imposition of a penalty for fraud. Inasmuch as by their own handbook, rules, 
regulations, and State Statute, self employment activities that generate income below the 
weekly benefit amount (or no income, as was found in this case) are not prohibited, the 
required repayment, denial of benefits, and fraud penalty should not have been imposed. 
Furthermore, since the knowledge and intent required for fraud cannot be presumed from 
an inaccurate or a non-filing, the imposition of the fraud penalty based on such a 
presumption, again, should not have been imposed. Deficiencies in the process, 
including the effective denial of the calling of a witness, lack of legal counsel, among 
other things, may have violated constitutional guarantees of due process. Rindlisbacher 
is seeking a revocation of the fraud penalty, a determination that prior benefits need not 
be repaid, and reinstatement of benefits that have not been received, along with his 
attorney's fees and costs. ,
 § 
Respectfully submitted, 
Thomas J. Klc, Attorney for Petitioner Rindlisbacher 
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